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A Desert Strange

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For years its remoteness and inaccessibility consigned it to the sidelines, but Mkomazi was always worth saving. Its northern boundaries lie up against Kenya's vast Tsavo national park and together the two reserves cover more than 8,000 square miles, forming one of the largest ecosystems on earth. ... The sense of space is overwhelming. To the south, the Usumbura (*sic*) mountains form a dramatic backdrop. To the north lie the rust-red game trails and blue faraway

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hills of Tsavo; and to the north-west looms the snowcapped Kilimanjaro. Its tourism potential, as yet untapped, is enormous. At present there is nowhere for visitors to stay; but there are plans for an eco-friendly safari lodge or tented camp. When it is built Mkomazi will be well on the way to becoming a Tanzanian Tsavo. Yet until the late Eighties Mkomazi remained forgotten. By then it had become badly degraded. Poaching, overgrazing, deliberate burning and unregulated trophy-hunting had taken their toll. Its black rhinos had been wiped out. Fewer than a dozen elephants survived and the future of the reserve itself hung in the balance. Only since 1988, when the Tanzanian government reassessed its value, has Mkomazi's true importance been recognised. A decision was taken to restore the reserve and save its remaining wildlife (Jackman, 1999¹).

It is also worth repeating the excerpt reproduced at the beginning of the book:

Mkomazi is potentially one of the most beautiful and important game reserves on the continent. ... Until 1988, it represented a classic example of ecological decline and degradation, over grazed, persistently eroded and the subject of indiscriminate and widespread poaching. ... Since 1988 the entire resources of the Trust have been devoted to the project. ... One of the most fragile, threatened and beautiful parts of Africa has been reborn ... The Mkomazi Project has a unique aspect. The rebuilding of Mkomazi Game Reserve, the rehabilitation of its wildlife, the endangered species programmes and the outreach programmes do not simply attempt to 'hold the line' on conservation. They are an endeavor to re-establish a complete ecosystem and thus positively reverse the damage that has been done (GAWPT (UK) fundraising document, *circa* 1994).

We have seen that this is not the only interpretation of Mkomazi's history and environment.² It is by no means certain that the environment was 'degraded' as a result of human occupation. The notion of wilderness is itself problematic.³ Portraying Mkomazi as a wilderness unspoiled by people denies its history and the many ways it was used by a variety of people long-resident in or near it. 'Wilderness' is much more a western notion of what Africa should be like than of what the plains have been to its residents. Through the claims made in fundraising documents, the Trusts are recasting Mkomazi in the minds of their funders in the mould of a world view formed in Europe and America.

The Trusts are creating a myth about Mkomazi. By that I do not mean a set of ideas that are false – there are true myths. Rather myths are charismatic ideas that motivate people to action and direct their activity.⁴ It is true that some elements of the Mkomazi myth are flawed, misleading or wrong. But no deception is involved. The Trustees and their supporters passionately believe their literature. They are people of integrity, with a strong and active concern for important causes. It is because they see their interpretation of Mkomazi to be cogent and urgent that they have taken on the costs and responsibility of saving the Reserve. It is because this is such a powerfully convincing and persuasive myth that the Reserve's conservation has

been so successful. It is because such a flawed image can persist so successfully that we must consider its implications.

The myth's power is evident in the stories circulated during the preparation of the rhinoceros sanctuary, which was built in 1996 and stocked with Black Rhinoceros in 1997. The sanctuary is part of a broader strategy to set up well-guarded breeding populations throughout East and Southern Africa. Rhinoceros from the Addo Elephant National Park in South Africa, which has held the East African sub-species (*Diceros bicornis michaeli*), go to Mkomazi and other sites leaving valuable rhino habitat available for the Southern African sub-species (*D.b. bicornis*).⁵ The Addo authorities plan to buy the Southern African sub-species from Namibia so that Namibian farmers can be financially rewarded for conserving Black Rhino on their land.

The plan is straightforward, but at Mkomazi it involved the sanctuary's advocates taking a peculiar stance in the contests surrounding the Reserve. The conflicting claims made on the Reserve were not adequately represented in the early stages of the project. A report on the sanctuary for the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) African Rhino Specialist Group stated:

There appears to be limited resentment towards the Mkomazi Game Reserve by the Msaai [*sic*], as they were well aware that their permission to graze within the reserve was only a temporary one (Harrie Simons and Truus Nicolson, pers. comm.) ... The more numerous Wapare and Wasambar [*sic*] tribe members within the Kisiwane [*sic*] and Uzambaras [*sic*] areas were never historically associated with the reserve and thus have no negative feelings towards it ... it would appear that the introduction of black rhino into the MGR would be: ... little affected by the limited to dwindling negative feelings towards the surrounding communities (Knight and Morkel, 1994: 6–7⁶).

This is wrong. But what is more extraordinary, given the proposed origin of the rhino, is that, at the end of 1996, South African members of the African Rhino Specialist Group appeared to be unaware of the report's inaccuracies two years after evicted herders had brought their first court case.⁷ When the South African authorities made further enquiries about the problems in 1997 they were told by Tanzanian government officials that the court cases of evicted pastoralists were being brought by Maasai 'originating from Kenya'.⁸ Recent drafts of a management plan for Mkomazi also invents history:

When the Mkomazi/Umba Game Reserves were established, six pastoral families were living inside and they were compensated in order to move to areas outside the reserve (MNRT, 1997: ii).

Meanwhile international representations of the Reserve continue to combine a concern to provide for its neighbours with literature downplaying the evictions and their costs, both social and economic. Some

fundraising documents fail to mention the legal conflicts surrounding the Reserve; others did not say that people were evicted, and just stated that the Reserve was 'rehabilitated'. The Chairman of the British Trust has questioned the severity of the consequences of eviction, saying that:

The lot of the local villagers is no better and no worse than that of most of the rural population in Tanzania (Eltringham, 1997: 30⁹).

The international representation of Mkomazi ends up being an almost Orwellian rewriting of the Reserve's, and its people's, histories.

It is frequently said that conservation uses 'depoliticising scientific rhetoric' to 'escape the complex ethical and political considerations that lie at the heart of policies that ultimately result in land and other resources being targeted for wildlife conservation'.¹⁰ Depoliticised debates make it difficult to discern whether or not harm is being done and to whom. Depoliticised goals and organisations are idealised. They have more space, freedom and power to act. But Mkomazi's case endorses Friedman's warning that 'the power to do good is also the power to do harm ... what one man (*sic*) regards as good another may regard as harm'.¹¹ At Mkomazi, scientific opinions on the degradation of the Reserve and expert ecologists' endorsement of the sanctuary have been used to further the conservation cause, evading politically sensitive issues.¹² But depoliticising rhetoric is not the only means of evading political sensitivities. Freedom and idealism have been enhanced by stories about the Reserve's history and current circumstances that were not accurate. Political neutrality has been promoted by fictions.

The case of Mkomazi suggests two reasons for the strength of fortress conservation. The first is that myths work. The Mkomazi myths can bring in much revenue. They result in the enforcement of exclusion and the creation of wilderness in the image desired by its creators. Myths may be wrong, but that is not the point. Myths are powerful. They motivate people; they help them to organise and understand their worlds; they provide structure and meaning; they are the source of beliefs, hopes and plans.¹³

Myths are not overturned by facts. Facts are judged by their accordance with myths.¹⁴ Groups subscribing to myths often have criteria as to what constitutes good knowledge. In a sense the conservationists at Mkomazi and their allies can be seen as a 'folk' with their own culture, history, lore, standards, values and definitions of who arbitrates truth. Cohen, writing on the nature of knowledge among Shetlanders of Whalsay who are continually dealing with, and denying, outside 'experts' advice about how to fish and manage their fishing industry, observes that:

For the Expert Outsider, salient knowledge is substantive: problems may be resolved by having 'knowledge' applied to them. For locals, the disputation

with experts may not call into question the *substance* of their knowledge, but its appropriateness. The sense of a discrete local knowledge does not deny that outsiders could know 'what we know' but, rather, that they could know 'as we know'. In viewing the world across their conceptual boundaries, Whalsay people argue for a kind of relativity of knowledge, insisting that while facts may well be facts, their interpretations and implications are culture bound (Cohen, 1993: 33, emphasis in the original).

Compare that description of local knowledge and expert opinion with this statement about the value of 'local conservationist' observations and the problems of expert wildlife knowledge:

Wildlife statistics are always difficult and flawed. In Africa they are highly suspect. ... Real evidence comes from the field from those who are able to observe clearly on a daily basis patterns in populations and movement and the effect of natural and human influences and from those who are neither reluctant nor afraid to both record and share this information (Tony Fitzjohn, 20 June 1996, to the Sub Committee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans, Committee of Resources, House of Representatives, Capitol Hill).

If Fitzjohn's views are representative of a wider body of conservation society then there are similarities between the Whalsay and conservation communities over what constitutes 'real' data. Depoliticising expertise may be promoted, but expertise that is perceived to threaten the authority of raw experience is not. History gleaned from local accounts or records, or concerns for the statistical representativeness of the field observations, are sidelined. Instead there is an intense, visceral knowledge of what the environments are like and should look like.

If facts are grounded and created in myth, then I cannot agree with Adams and McShane when they state that 'conservation based on myth is bound to fail'.¹⁵ The power of the fortress conservation narrative, its emotive appeal and the hard certainties it offers may well ensure it persists long into the future. Conservative conservation policies preserve not just a dream of Africa, but also reproduce and sustain its supporters. Protected areas and their supporters live in symbiosis, each sustains the other.

Adams and McShane's judgement is too sweeping. There will probably be more diversity in practices and outcome. Even if 'normal' practices change and become more inclusive of local needs, the old views will still exist. Conservation practices will be a patchwork of reactionary and tolerant regimes. Indeed, old practices, even if replaced, may resurface. Suppose some conservative regimes do fail, and their protected areas are overrun by people, as happened at Mkomazi in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet repressive policies could still arise, fed by a groundswell of western dreams and the alliance between international conservation organisations and the state. It would be an ironic resurrection. If 'dying' protected areas can be resuscitated, it is

because they are resilient and not threatened with imminent destruction. They are continually vulnerable to being saved, recreated and restored to the pantheon of 'last wildernesses' upon which fortress conservation thrives.

The second reason for the success of fortress conservation is that the necessity for participation is limited. Communities are heterogeneous and divided. The numerous peoples who live around Mkomazi have divergent interests. Few may profit from the Reserve, but the pastoral groups, who have lost considerably, are relatively weak locally. It is possible to ignore those who do not benefit.

The practice of rule, and the operation of power, revolves very much around such divisions. Conservation is about controlling people and their environments. It is about exercising power over how people use land, and how they change their land-use and how they lobby their government to allow them to change their practices. There may be powerful ethical reasons to try to make this process as inexpensive as possible, but it may also be a project for which there are unavoidable expenses to be paid. Those paying the costs may resist, but such opposition is likely to come from rural groups who are unorganised and poorly equipped. Unwelcome policies can be imposed.¹⁶

Marks declared that:

The romantic vision of keeping Africa as an unchanged paradise teeming with wildlife is a foreign nonsense, for to ask East Africa to perpetuate such an image is to ask it to stay poor and undeveloped (Marks, 1984: 130).

But surely he errs if he expects the poverty to cause the vision to fail. If the poverty is only experienced by the rural poor, and if the benefits are experienced by elites at home and abroad, then the vision has a good chance of success. Foreign it may be, but it remains much at home in the protected areas of East Africa.

In Zimbabwe, Duffy has suggested that when conservation NGOs try to operate in a social, economic or political vacuum their projects may fail as the local politics of conservation activities begin to take effect.¹⁷ In Tanzania, however, local factors have only a weak influence compared to the power of the state and the resources of internationally funded conservation. The continual local attempts to use resources or secure use rights are rebuffed with little consequence to conservation objectives.

A resilient environment would again, ironically, help maintain such a state of affairs. Exclusion usually has to deal with mass civil disobedience, when neighbours will flout its laws as often as necessary. The deterrent of rangers' presence and fines will curtail this activity to some extent. But a resilient environment is well able to absorb the impacts of the low-level and intermittent use resulting. Because the environment is not as fragile as exclusion policies assume, the situation works.

The problems of community conservation

But how typical are the problems of Mkomazi? Is it a good representation of conservation in Africa, or elsewhere? There are two reasons to suggest that it is atypical.

First, I have referred in this book to a generic group of 'conservationists'. I have painted a monochromatic picture of their views that ignores the diversity of interests, theory, thinking and experience found in conservation. Moreover, it is a dynamic diversity. The values, and their relative strengths, change. The attitudes I have encountered at Mkomazi represent but one strand of that changing thinking. But it is a separate task, for which I am not qualified, to portray the full make-up and variety of conservationist thought.

Second, the case of Mkomazi is stark. The geography of the Reserve, the uncertainty of its environment, the proximity of the mountains, the numbers of people around it, Tanzania's weak economic position that makes opportunities of other employment so slender, and the shrillness of the debate, suggest it may be an unusual test case. There may be more physical and political room for compromise elsewhere.

But it is probably true that all protected areas are contested. Their use is disputed by groups who see different purposes for them. The ideals championed by conservation may overlook the people who live near, and often once inside, the protected areas. These people question the worth and legitimacy of such values, and the rights of others to appropriate aesthetic and financial benefits. The disputes are concerned with ideals of beauty, sustainability or 'good use' and who should benefit materially from the uses chosen. Here the very starkness and extremism of Mkomazi serve to clarify some of the problems inherent in constructing the alternative offered by community conservation policies to fortress conservation. The case of Mkomazi suggests responses to the three doubts raised in the introduction about community conservation (p.8).

First, Mkomazi shows that it can be well-nigh impossible for benefits from protected areas to match the costs incurred from lost resources. Mkomazi underlines an essential inequality in African conservation. The opportunity costs of protecting areas are borne by the rural poor, while the benefits accrue to national elites and wealthy foreign tourists.¹⁸ Many rural groups know conservation policy as something that brings little good they can enjoy, and causes much hardship and suffering.¹⁹

Community conservation will become possible where it recognises that conservation can be valued by the rural poor only insofar as it improves their standard of living.²⁰ Attempts to 'educate' the rural poor about conservation are likely to fail unless their livelihoods are clearly and directly enhanced.²¹ Livelihood enhancement needs to be central to the enterprise for community conservation to succeed.²² Community

conservation, therefore, is a development issue.²³ It involves conflict mediation, equitable distribution of benefits, accountability of leaders, subsidiarity, representation and tenure over, and access to, land and resources. The latter are particularly important. The case of Mkomazi shows that economic justice will not be possible unless the rural poor have direct access to the resources of protected areas.

But it must be recognised that economic benefits alone are not the end of the matter. Gibson and Marks have shown that rural hunters gain much more than simply economic benefit from hunting.²⁴ Hunting is part of their identity, through which they gain respect and power. Economic benefits encouraging them to cease hunting may miss the mark. Alexander and McGregor argue that the economic benefits of CAMPFIRE were rejected by communities whose vision of their own development did not entail living off wildlife. Economic benefits from wildlife were vigorously resisted by people who saw their history as progressing away from the disease and problems that wildlife could bring and who wanted to choose other ways of managing their lands.²⁵

Second, it may not matter that costs exceed benefits if those who lose are politically weak. The heterogeneity and divisions of communities may make the politics of forging alliances easier. The international conservation agenda is rarely just imposed by powerful outsiders on weak and helpless villagers. Although rural groups are often weak, they are not powerless but have bargaining power.²⁶ Local groups have long histories of negotiating with 'outsiders' and ensuring that they do not lose as heavily as they might have done.²⁷ We have seen that not all protected areas' neighbours resent their presence. A problem with human rights lobbying at Mkomazi is that it is ill-equipped to deal with the diversity of needs in 'local communities'.

The third problem facing community conservation that Mkomazi illustrates is that it is an unnecessary and potentially dangerous option. Exclusion has been successful at Mkomazi. Opposition is weak and ineffectual. The new measures may not offer the security fortress conservation offers for the valued species and landscapes.²⁸ Fortress conservation depends on an international community of wealthy preservationists for its finance, ideas and motivation. The power and wealth of this community make fortress conservation sustainable. Devolving power over these havens to locals threatens their future and may not have the conservation community's support.

Some of the support offered to community conservation is marked by continuity with old agendas. For example, Adams and McShane take as their imperative for reform the threat to wildlife, not the needs of people.²⁹ For others it offers hope to conservationists who fear for the fate of species beyond the borders of protected areas.³⁰ Westerners and others take the protected areas as given and look beyond their borders for future

reforms. They call for action from 'society as a whole' to cope with the current extinction crisis.³¹ But who does 'society' include, and whose values will set society's agenda? What are the political processes by which rival views are resolved? At Mkomazi, social action has been encouraged to further a fixed, predetermined, conservation goal. Local people are invited to support that project and offered some incentives to do so by means of outreach activities. Much energy has been spent cultivating the support of international elites with the money and time to support the Reserve's rehabilitation and enjoy its wildernesses.

Mackenzie found in colonial Kenya that a 'discriminatory environmentalism' became crucial in the construction of power relations built on race.³² Similarly, Beinart has observed that the measures to preserve wildlife, soil and vegetation become closely bound to prevailing segregation policies.³³ It could be argued that similar forces are at work in present-day African conservation. The division now is not race but that conjunction of wealth, class and international influence that determines which groups win or lose from conservation agendas. Currently, wealthy westerners are most able to consume the benefits of conservation and national elites benefit most from the tourism industry, but both are subsidised by rural groups who bear the costs of giving up land and resources.³⁴ The poor are discriminated against because their livelihoods are changed; the affluent remain untouched.

Fortresses do not just enclose wildernesses, they defend western lifestyles. They draw attention and activism to protected areas abroad and away from issues of energy consumption at home. They are therefore a powerful and far-reaching 'anti-politics machine' that 'whisks political realities out of sight', both with respect to the application of projects in Africa and the international setting of conservation.³⁵ Alternative models of conservation do not adequately deal with these international aspects. They can be grounded more in wealthy westerners' conservation ideals than rural Africans' needs. Adams and McShane, for example, advocate material self-denial that is inappropriate for the poorest countries of the world:

The challenge for Africa, indeed for all regions of the world, is to reconfigure economic structures and community values so that people can improve the quality of their lives without the constant accumulation of material wealth (Adams and McShane, 1992: 250).

Secular western societies are not espousing this philosophy, despite environmentalists' exhortations; a western politician could not advocate it in his constituency and hope for re-election. Given current global patterns of resource and energy consumption, it is more appropriate to pioneer such principles in the USA, Europe, Japan or the wealthy Middle Eastern states than Africa.

An alternative?

There is a danger that talk about the changes community conservation can bring will remain just talk. It is in the face of this Machiavellian scenario that the basic challenge to fortress conservation becomes clear. The essential objection is ethical: it is not fair. The enforcement of exclusion entails injustice. It leaves many rural people, and observers, with a powerful sense of a wrong being done. It leaves increasing numbers of conservationists with the same impression.³⁶

Exclusion entails more than just displacement and loss of livelihoods, but also the loss of homes and places of spiritual, emotional and cultural importance.³⁷ The takeover of territory, and the usurpation of power and authority to manage and inhabit the landscape, renders once-familiar places 'a desert strange and chill'.³⁸ These words, written in protest at the enclosure movement in England two hundred years ago, were part of a poem filled with the indignation and anger evictees know. They are apposite to Mkomazi, where people have been evicted and impoverished in order to cleanse a land reinvented as wilderness. The image of Mkomazi created for funders and tourists is 'a desert strange' to those whose home it was.

It is in such injustice that the power of the challenge to the myths of fortress conservation lies. If its images depend on comfortable myths, the ethical problems of its reality are too uncomfortable to be tolerated. But it is precisely here that community conservation needs to be evaluated carefully. If it only appears to address material needs and gives only the semblance of power-sharing then community conservation will just perpetuate the same injustices under new guises.

The case of Mkomazi shows that people have long been a part of the landscape and environment of the Reserve. It challenges the determinism that holds that people will necessarily degrade the environment. The uncertainty means it is less imperative to move people. If we do not know what the environment is doing then it is hard to cite environmental reasons to justify causing the impoverishment eviction brings. I have argued elsewhere that this uncertainty is likely to persist.³⁹ It is only with careful long-term research that we will know how Mkomazi's environment responds to people's use of it. It is also dangerous to deny that degradation could occur; it is necessary to respect the precautionary principles that guard against degradation.⁴⁰

Mkomazi's situation also makes it clear that a just solution to people's needs must allow some form of use of the Reserve's resources. Any buffer zones outside the Reserve would just be an expansion of the Reserve's influence. The compromise has to take place within the borders of the Reserve. This would not require new legislation. Use of reserve resources is permitted at the discretion of the Director of Wildlife.

There are three caveats. First, rectifying injustice at Mkomazi would not mean allowing use to all people. Some locals may not want all the former residents back. I cannot say what complexion of rights and permits would be considered most just to most people, only that some use must be allowed. It may be easier in the east of the Reserve, where opposition to pastoralists is slighter, and 'biodiversity', tourism, and wildlife interests fewer. Second, how could people manage that use? One of the central concerns of those who fear degradation is that rural people do not know how to manage their resources. At Mkomazi there are institutions governing the communal use of water and pasture. However, we have also seen that such institutions are dynamic; they may be weak and can fail. They may not provide the security conservation and local users require. It may be useful to explore ways of supporting these institutions. Third, local use would occur in the absence of any clear understanding of how such use affects the environment. Some form of monitoring and observation would be required.

Sen argues that no matter what the intrinsic moral value of a particular 'good', empirical analysis of causes, effects and consequences of pursuing that good is essential.⁴¹ Whether this good be the conservation of disappearing landscapes, or addressing the social injustices resulting from conservation policy, the same challenge applies. Just compromises will depend upon detailed analysis of histories, ecologies, social outcomes and politics. It is for this end that these pages have been written.

Notes

- 1 The article also gives strong support to the Trusts' Field Officer, which suggests that this portrayal of the African environment works not just by creating images of the environment, but also by celebrating larger-than-life personae through which exclusion's supporters can vicariously live their ambitions, and apply their dreams (I am grateful to Peter Rogers for this point). The article continues thus:

But who could take on such a challenge? The job required someone who was comfortable at the cutting edge of conservation. It needed a man who could handle animals, who was fluent in Swahili, a skilled mechanic who could build roads, fly a plane, strip down a Land Rover, organise anti-poaching patrols, run a remote bush camp and deal with the endless bureaucracy. All this it demanded – plus the ability to establish breeding programmes for highly endangered species and beat the drum on fundraising trips to Europe and the US. In Africa today such people are even rarer than the black rhino; but eventually a choice was made. Tony Fitzjohn is one of those restless, swash-buckling Englishmen that only the wildness of Africa can satisfy ... 'there's a job to be done in Mkomazi and I intend to see it through. I meet people in Tanzania, from top officials to ordinary kids in the street, who say to me, Tony, we can't do anything about the way things are: but you can. I say to them, but look, I'm just a bloody *Mzungu* (*sic*), a white man. And they say, but you know how to play the game and we want you to do it for us.'

- 2 cf. Turton, 1996: 107.
- 3 Western, 1994: 18; Turton, 1987: 180; Anderson and Grove, 1987: 4–6; Adams and McShane, 1992; Brockington and Homewood, 1996: 93.
- 4 Roe, 1991: 288.
- 5 In addition, the transport plane that brought the animals to East Africa took others back to South Africa, increasing the gene pool there too.
- 6 The report authors stated that the information came from the then Mkomazi Outreach Programme staff.
- 7 Knight, pers. comm., 3/12/1996.
- 8 Koch, 1997. In fact, in their written statement to the court, the Tanzanian government explicitly accept that the plaintiffs are Tanzanian citizens.
- 9 Letter to the editor, *Tanzanian Affairs: Journal of the Britain-Tanzania Society*, no. 58, Sept–Dec. The problem with this claim is that it was based on regional health statistics dated from 1982 and 1972 (Eltringham to Lane, 4/11/97). These are not good data to use. The impact of eviction cannot be assessed from data gathered prior to its occurrence, and regional statistics are not appropriate to monitor effects at the local level. The remark is also discordant with other ideas that the Chairman has published, which stress the importance of wildlife paying for itself, and the unreasonableness of expecting people near protected areas to pay the expenses wildlife can bring (Eltringham, 1994: 168).
- 10 Duffy, 2000: 2, 173.
- 11 Friedman, 1962, cited in Fisher, 1997.
- 12 For example, it is quite clear too that the rhino sanctuary's purpose was not just to conserve the Black rhinoceros but also to enhance the Reserve's future. As the Field Officer put it: 'I do feel that a project as prestigious as the rhino sanctuary, plus some form of revenue from a small but exclusive tourist venture in the reserve, must be forthcoming within the next year for Mkomazi to survive as a game reserve' (Fitzjohn, 1993: 9).
- 13 Roe, 1991; Adams and Hulme, 2001a.
- 14 cf. Marks, 1984: 4.
- 15 Adams and McShane, 1992: 245.
- 16 cf. Peluso, 1993.
- 17 Duffy, 2000: 114.
- 18 Bell, 1987; Marks, 1984: 130.
- 19 cf. Mishra, 1982.
- 20 WCED, 1997; Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1997: 64. This is not to say that people are only motivated by economic gain. A complex web of beliefs, values and desires, explicit and hidden, drives our actions. But pursuit of survival and prosperity are strong driving forces of human behaviour. People will only abide poverty, or threats to their survival, in unusual circumstances.
- 21 Blaikie and Jeanrenaud, 1997: 64, 67.
- 22 Murphree, 1996: 162; Ghimire and Pimbert, 1997: 35.
- 23 Murphree, 1996.
- 24 Gibson and Marks, 1995: 950.
- 25 Alexander and McGregor, 2000: 624–5.
- 26 Neumann, 1991.
- 27 Illiffe, 1979; Waller, 1976; Mosse, 1997.

- 28 Kangwana (2001) notes that the ability of community conservation to achieve conservation goals is not clear.
- 29 'Conservation will either contribute to solving the problems of the rural poor who live day to day with wild animals, or those animals will disappear' (Adams and McShane, 1992: xix).
- 30 Adams and Hulme, 2001: 18.
- 31 Western *et al.*, 1989: 317.
- 32 Mackenzie 1998: 97, cf. Lal, 1995.
- 33 Beinart, 1989.
- 34 Norton-Griffiths, 1996.
- 35 The phrase is Ferguson's, 1990 (from 1994 edition, p. xv); cf. Brockington, 2001a.
- 36 Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 279.
- 37 Oliver-Smith, 1996: 78; Gray, 1996: 101.
- 38 Thornton, 1997: 68. The extract is from Clare's poem, 'Remembrances', of the mid-1840s.
- 39 Brockington and Homewood, 2001.
- 40 O'Riordan, 2000.
- 41 Sen, 1988.